The authors of this ambitious book address a fundamental political question: why are leaders who produce peace and prosperity turned out of office while those who preside over corruption, war, and misery endure? Considering this political puzzle, they also answer the related economic question of why some countries experience successful economic development and others do not.The authors construct a provocative theory on the selection of leaders and present specific formal models from which their central claims can be deduced. They show how political leaders allocate resources and how institutions for selecting leaders create incentives for leaders to pursue good and bad public policy. They also extend the model to explain the consequences of war on political survival. Throughout the book, they provide illustrations from history, ranging from ancient Sparta to Vichy France, and test the model against statistics gathered from cross-national data. The authors explain the political intuition underlying their theory in nontechnical language, reserving formal proofs for chapter appendixes. They conclude by presenting policy prescriptions based on what has been demonstrated theoretically and empirically.
Ficha técnica
Editorial: Mit Press
ISBN: 9780262524407
Idioma: Inglés
Número de páginas: 550
Tiempo de lectura:
11h 24m
Encuadernación: Tapa blanda
Fecha de lanzamiento: 26/03/2013
Año de edición: 2005
Plaza de edición: Usa
Especificaciones del producto
Escrito por Bruce Bueno de Mesquita y ALISTAIR SMITH
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita es titular de la cátedra Julius Silver de Política en la Universidad de Nueva York y director del Alexander Hamilton Center for Political Economy. A través de su consultora en Nueva York, ha ejercido como asesor del gobierno de Estados Unidos para asuntos de seguridad nacional. Es autor de numerosos libros y de artículos para The New York Times, International Herald Tribune y Los Angeles Times.